Calvin Presentation: Intellectualism, Voluntarism, and the Free Will
Here is my presentation on Calvin's Institutes. Though I have not read it over in a long time, I thought posting it might be helpful for its refinement.
I have a few scrapped sentences and paragraphs at the end, before the annotated bibliography, and if I repeat myself in them forgive me, for I do not have the appropriate grasp of the topic that would allow me to be coherent and pithy when speaking about it. I believe discussion with a professor who has thought the will through thoroughly would be very helpful.
ANY AND ALL FEEDBACK WOULD BE APPRECIATED (Note: This is my very first attempt at writing anything concerning the free will, and the first time I have studied the topic. I had not prior to this paper ventured into the predestination debate, and due to my ignorance of the topic any shared insight would be helpful. I also have not come upon a solid representation of the Arminian stance so if you happen to know any key arguments that would help me figure out which is biblical.)
I have a few scrapped sentences and paragraphs at the end, before the annotated bibliography, and if I repeat myself in them forgive me, for I do not have the appropriate grasp of the topic that would allow me to be coherent and pithy when speaking about it. I believe discussion with a professor who has thought the will through thoroughly would be very helpful.
ANY AND ALL FEEDBACK WOULD BE APPRECIATED (Note: This is my very first attempt at writing anything concerning the free will, and the first time I have studied the topic. I had not prior to this paper ventured into the predestination debate, and due to my ignorance of the topic any shared insight would be helpful. I also have not come upon a solid representation of the Arminian stance so if you happen to know any key arguments that would help me figure out which is biblical.)
THE AUTHOR DOES NOT KNOW IF HE AGREES WITH WHAT HE HAS WRITTEN
Intellectualism, Voluntarism, and the Free Will
Introduction:
Body Paragraph: Calvin’s view of the soul as it is created
Calvin’s view of the soul and its faculties as it progresses from its created to fallen state reveals the concept of the will put forth in the Institutes. Man consists of two parts, the body and the soul, and Calvin, in regards to the created human nature, ascribes to the soul the role of mover, “[I]t hold[s] the first place in ruling man’s life” (192). The soul is both a spiritual guide and mover of man’s body. In describing the soul, Calvin begins by explaining that it contains two essential faculties: the understanding and will (194-195). It is this concept of the soul as rational and appetitive that founds the medieval understanding of man as a rational animal (Calvin 196; Hoitenga 24).
The understanding, or intellect, is the cognitive faculty held within man’s soul that discerns between two choices, and is led by reason. Calvin states, the “office [...] of understanding [is] to distinguish between objects as each seems worthy of approval or disapproval” (194). Calvin’s definition of man’s understanding in its created state is consistent with most medieval theology, which states that the intellect has two forms of judgment: the ability to judge an end as either good or evil, and the judgment of what means are best suited to bring about the desired end (195; Hoitenga 26).
Calvin defines the will, or appetite, as the faculty of action that pursues that which the mind discerns as pleasing, and avoids what the mind deems as repulsive, and by doing so he makes the understanding and will of man inseparable. He states that the office of “the will [is] to choose and follow what the understanding pronounces good, but to reject and flee what it disapproves” (Calvin 194). Calvin’s definition bears a striking resemblance to that of Aquinas’ definition of the will as “rational appetite” (88). The will has two main functions or components, the inclination and ability to choose (Calvin 195, 294; Hoitenga 25). The inclination is the power that moves man to seek an object that is not presently possessed or some end that is not yet attained, by an appropriate means. The ability to choose enables man to select the means to attain the end, and even to select between two or more competing ends, and thus it directs desire. In regards to activity, Hoitenga states, “it is in virtue of these two components of the will that we are moved, that we move ourselves, to perform any properly human action” (25). However, the appetite when considered in itself is irrational.
The intellectual judgments, which guide the will, enable man to attain a wide rage of ends in a wide variety of ways, and to postpone the attainment of ends in contrast with the instant satisfaction that is character of the animal appetite, and allows man to account for his actions by answering why he did what he did. In summary of the benefits of this union, Hoitenga states, “Human beings, in contrast to other animals, can know what they are doing (or what they are about to do), why they do it, and whether it is good or evil” (26). By defining the created will in such a way, Calvin makes rationality essential to defining human acts.
Body Paragraph: Calvin’s view of the fallen soul
After explaining the created state of man’s soul Calvin shifts his attention to the soul’s condition after the fall. As reason for the fall, Calvin states that Adam “fell solely by his own will” (195). That, rather than a fault of the intellect, man was inclined towards and chose sin with his appetitive faculty. Calvin’s account for the fallen state of man establishes an intensive and thorough corruption of the created soul. After Adam volitionally sinned, he and all following men have entered into a state of what Calvin calls the “death of [man’s] soul” (Calvin 246, 251). By death Calvin means that man is incapable without the direct grace of God to perform any spiritual good. No part of his nature has been left unmarred by sin, as Calvin states, “no part is immune from sin and all that proceeds from him is to be imputed to sin” (Calvin 253). He also makes the distinction that sin, or a sinful nature, does not rest upon imitation, but is in an inborn defect that all men carry from their mother’s womb, and “this hereditary depravity” is called original sin (Calvin 246-7). “In destroying himself he corrupted his own blessings” (Calvin 195).
In regards to the affect of sin upon the gifts with which God lavished man before the fall, Calvin states, “The natural gifts where corrupted in man through sin, [but] his supernatural gifts [faith as well as righteousness] were stripped from him” (270). Man lost these endowments and does not suffer any harm to his essence by doing so since they were not qualities of his nature but manifestations of God’s grace. All these attributes are describes by Calvin as beyond nature, not intrinsic to man, but as a continual manifestations of God’s grace, thus when they are destroyed man’s essence is left enact.
Among the natural gifts, Calvin includes both the will and intellect. The nature of their corruption is expressed when Calvin states, “Soundness of mind and uprightness of heart were withdrawn at the same time, [and this] is to be known as the corruption of the natural gifts” (Calvin 270). Operationally they do not, and cannot function as they were created to, since the mind is “plunged into darkness,” meaning that it is left without ability to perceive and comprehend the good, and the will is “depraved,” meaning that it is bound necessarily to the choice and pursuit of wicked desires (Calvin 270-271). These two faculties are necessary to man’s nature; by being part of his essence they are intrinsic to his being, thus they cannot be wholly lost or man cannot be said to exist. However, Calvin is careful to dispel any assumptions that these remaining ruins of the soul can perform their original tasks by accounting for their thorough corruption and resulting impairment of any proper operation.
After the fall, Calvin claims Human understanding retains in itself some “form of perception,” and that “it is by nature captivated by love of truth” (271). However, Calvin distinguishes here between understanding and the reason that man was created with, but lost. Man is yet able to perceive and process input, but is “incapable […] of seeking and finding truth” (Calvin 271). Understanding is still a process of analysis, but after the fall it cannot produce sound judgment, “even when it seems to follow the way, it limps and staggers,” because it has lost the guide of sound reason (Calvin 273). This does not mean man cannot say something true, but rather that no truth is ever had apart from God directly giving it to man as gift, where before the fall he contained in himself competent reason. Furthermore Calvin makes the distinction that man does not strive toward or even try “to understand who the true God is or what sort of God He wishes to be towards us” (278). Revelation is thus the only hope for a man to even see God, let alone turn to Him. Though, according to Calvin general revelation is insufficient seeing that the truth is perpetually perverted in man, thus special revelation is necessary for knowledge of God and faith.
The will like the intellect, according to Calvin, is operationally destroyed, but supposedly not essentially destroyed. This means that the will contains in itself the same functions, inclination and ability to choose, but it now follows the guidance of his corrupt nature rather than the intellect. By destruction Calvin means, “The human will [cannot seek] after the right so long as the will remains set in its own perversity” (293). The man’s servitude to his sinful nature is here expressed by Calvin, and sin, rather than being rationally chosen, is pursued due to the man’s sinful nature. Reinforcing this nature directed concept of the will, Calvin states, “Therefore simply to will is of man; to will ill, of a corrupt nature; to will well, of grace” (295). The will takes a drastic turn after the fall and rather than being rational appetite, is mere appetite. Calvin embraces the implications of this statement and states that “like an animal, he follows the inclination of his nature, without reason, without deliberation” (286).
Body Paragraph: Two views of Free will in the Institutes
Within Calvin’s Institutes there are two views of free will presented: the freedom of man’s will in the created state, and the freedom of man’s will after the fall. Both forms of the free will affirm that in order for an act to be considered free, the final causal source must be intrinsic to man. The free will is the ability to self-determine, which means that a person or agent makes use of the faculties contained in the soul. The will and intellect are not faculties of the soul like organs are to the body, which are self-functioning, but rather they are directed by a particular identity, the person, and thus cannot be have a universal result ascribed to them. A stomach digests naturally without conscious thought, but the will does not merely will. These persons may act as self-directing causes because the law of causality states that all effects have a preceding, antecedent cause, where an agent’s decision does not.
The first form of freedom, particular to the prelapsarian view of the will states that man must have “choice of good and evil” since he is “a rational animal” (Calvin 195, 196). This view of the will entails that man can both direct himself with his mind to, and move towards the good, since the will still ideally submits itself to the understanding. It also implies that all actions must be rational in order for them to be considered human acts. The way in which the intellect and mind direct themselves is that “For, the individual parts of his soul were formed to uprightness, the soundness of his mind stood firm, and his will was free to choose the good” (Calvin 196). This freedom is characterized as the created working order with the ability to move either towards evil or good.
The second definition of the free will that is instituted after the fall is: the uncoerced consent to, and internal inclination for sin. Free will after the fall is merely man’s will acting as the determining cause in all he does. This is shown when Calvin states, man is “enslaved because of necessity; free because of will” (296). Sin is not imposed upon the man by extrinsic causes, but rather his own sinful nature ensures his continual sinning. The final cause for his actions is still contained in himself, but that cause can only lead him to sin. Aquinas reinforces the idea of self-contained determining causal source for action when he states, “The movement of the will is from an intrinsic principle, just as natural movement is” (Aquinas 99). According to Calvin, sin is inevitable, and thus necessary. Only damnable things can come from the nature of man, and thus the free will man was created with is gone, but the ability of choice and self-determinism endures.
Body Paragraph: First inconsistency is in the created will and cause for fall
The first inconsistency in Calvin, as Hoitenga points out, is in his intellectualist view of the created will and his voluntarist explanation for the fall (69; Calvin 194-195). Calvin claims that in the created state the will is governed by the intellect, since it must “always be mindful of the bidding of the understanding,” and, “completely amenable to the guidance of reason” (194-195). Despite this dominance of the intellect in the relationship between the understanding and will, Calvin’s reason for the fall is the choice of man’s will and not an intellectual error, since Adam “fell solely by his own will” (195). In this theory of a purely appetitive choice, Calvin makes a clean break from intellectualism.
In philosophy the relationship between these two powers, intellect and will, have been viewed in two ways. The first is called intellectualism, which affirms the primacy of the intellect as the governing authority over the will. The second is voluntarism, which holds that the will directs itself according to the being’s nature, and has superior sway over the intellect, containing both choice and direction in itself.
Body Paragraph: Intellectualism
Three of the most famous intellectualists are Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas; however, Plato, who was instrumental in the founding of intellectualism, is a pure intellectualist, where Aristotle and Aquinas are modified intellectualists. In intellectualism, the will’s two most important acts are its natural inclination towards good and its necessary choice of the perceived good (Aquinas 88). The will is essentially part of a complex feedback system, which is to say that it responds to the input received through the intellect and senses, and acts in accordance with the passion for good that God created in man, “for it is the apprehended good that moves the will” (Hoitenga 30). The intellect brings rationality to the appetite of man, by making “the will completely amenable to the guidance of reason” (Calvin, 195). Within the intellectualist view, the will always wills the good. Aquinas states, “The will of man is not moved with necessity by the lower appetite,” meaning that desire cannot conquer the intellect or it is no longer the human will, but mere appetite (Aquinas 105).
In intellectualism the intellect is the final cause for all human acts, and thus the fall is attributed to the intellect’s failure: a bad was discerned as a good. Yet pure intellectualists and modified intellectualists disagree as to how the will pursued the evil under the assumption of good. Immoral acts, according to Aquinas, are not the result of a miscalculation (in contrast with the pure intellectualist idea of ignorance being the source of wickedness) but the result of a “double mindedness of the will,” or “vicious judgment” (Hoitenga 31, 32). This double mindedness of the will is the belief that man is endowed with an equal desire for both the good and evil, so that choice of either is perfectly possible and is determined solely by the mind’s judgment, not desire. Aquinas states, “That we must always act, even when doing evil act, under the guise of goodness” (Hoitenga 33).
Body Paragraph: Voluntarism
Voluntarism on the other side of the sphere, states that judgment is made by the will. In voluntarism, “the will is […] a power distinct from the intellect, with freedom as its defining characteristic” (40). The will may move as the will directs itself, and thus it acts as the final determining cause for man’s actions. Modified voluntarism’s relationship between intellect and will is not a perpetual dominance of the will over the intellect, in the sense that man never rationally acts, but that the will does possess the ability to overturn and resist the clear leading of the intellect. In explaining, Hoitenga states, “It is also capable of determining what particular judgments the intellect will attend to, in such a way that the intellect is no longer the uncontested governor of the will” (40). Thus the intellect cannot be said to direct man per se, because the intellect needs the consent of the will. Furthermore Calvin states, “The will […] is so bound in wicked desires that it cannot strive for what is right” (271). The bondage of the will directs man’s acts, not the bondage of the intellect, which reinforces the essential shift in Calvin’s thought (286). According to the voluntarist the fall, bluntly put, is the result of man’s consent to the desire for evil.
Body Paragraph Three: Summary
In summary, the way in which Calvin accounts for the fall leads one to understand the choice of the first sin as an act of the will and not intellect. Calvin separates himself from the intellectualists by dispelling Aquinas’ view of the fall being caused by a failure of the intellect, despite his proposed intellectualist view of the created will, and decides to take up a voluntarist account for the fall, as the choice of the appetite (Calvin 281). As result, Calvin contradicts himself: he explains himself to be an intellectualist, but demonstrates himself to be a voluntarist in both the cause and result of the fall.
Body Paragraph: Second inconsistency
Calvin’s second inconsistency rests in his understanding of the fallen soul. The soul essentially consists of understanding and will, the will essentially consists of inclination and choice, and the inclination essentially contains both desire for good and evil. Calvin states that the will is enslaved to the direction of his sinful nature and unable to choose good, and consequently does such great damage to the will that he destroys an essential component of the will: the man’s ability to choose good (270, 294-296). Hoitenga argues that this reduced concept of the will “leaves Calvin with a will that is even less than a shadow of its created nature. On Calvin’s view, the fall does not only corrupt the will, but nearly destroys it” (69-70). The desire for good is explained as essential to the will before the fall, and so it is essential to the will after the fall, and any abolishment of that necessity is to dispose of the will, which Calvin in turn claims to be essential to man’s existence (270). Calvin asserts a position that cannot explain the moral character of human action, and the continuing of man’s choice between good and evil after the fall.
Body Paragraph: No room for free will after fall with a prelapsarian view and postlapsarian voluntarist view.
Just as the will circumscribes what the free will is, so does what the free will is circumscribe what it is to necessitate. If the rationality is essential to the free will before the fall, as Calvin claims, then rationality is also essential to free will after the fall. Without this rationality there cannot be said to be freedom, but only the dominance of appetitive, not human, choice.
A resulting problem stemming from the abolishment of the intellect’s power to direct man is that he does not allow for human acts after the fall. The intellect must also retain its essential ability to judge between good and evil and direct man towards those ends in order for the actions of men to be considered human. Man is a rational animal, and his actions are thus rational and appetitive. Human acts by essence do not submit to the “lower appetite,” rather the lower appetite is moved by the intellect, and thus the rational animal performs rational animal acts (Aquinas, 105). A possible explanation for this stance would be that the fall has perverted the created order and this submission of the intellect to the will is part of that perversion. However, Calvin takes away what is necessary for human acts to be considered human as it was defined in its created state, and thus creates a new standard for what “human acts” are. The condition of man changes, the essence does not. An essence is “what a thing is”—what is required to distinguish it as it is (Aquinas 39). Any attempts to call man’s acts after the fall human acts would be inappropriate, and thus no guilt could move from the action to the man, since animal acts are not moral or immoral, and face no consequence. This rationality of man’s actions is required for man to remain responsible for his actions if Calvin endorses a prelapsarian intellectualist standpoint.
Man is thus after the fall, according to Calvin’s previous stance, a mere animal, having lost the direction of rationality. Calvin’s second inconsistency is that he demonstrates the destruction of man’s will, not its corruption, and thus leaves no room for the sins of man to be volitional. Calvin blurs the distinction between corruption and destruction. Both corruption and destruction can be looked at in two ways: operationally and essentially. In the former’s corruption the essential is not abolished, but rather the man’s exercising of the faculties is affected, but may will occasion the created order, but if the operation is destroyed all prior ability to function rightly. In an essential’s corruption means that the faculty is not removed, where if it is destroyed the very essence is eradicated. One cannot destroy intellect and will since they are essential aspects/qualities of man’s nature, but the will, in being separated from the intellect, is destroyed. He has two definitions for the same thing. Influence should change, not the thing itself. The mind may be said to have completely faulty conclusions, and thus the will only chooses sin, but the mind's role in the choices that man makes after the fall, as Calvin demonstrates, is virtually non-existent.
Conclusion: Calvin contradicts himself
Calvin believes in the will’s dominance over man’s actions after the fall and thus emphasizes, yet Calvin is inconsistent by being both a prelapsarian intellectualist and postlapsarian voluntarist. He begins by explaining himself strictly as an intellectualist before the fall, but attributes the fall of man to the choice of will and not to the wrong discernment of the intellect. In fact Calvin attacks the intellectualist account for sin, by attacking Plato’s concept of ignorance being the only sin. Secondly, Calvin, by becoming a postlapsarian voluntarist, does not corrupt the will, but destroys it, by removing that which is essential for it to be understood as the will. Furthermore, with his later understanding of sin and will, Calvin would have to affirm that the nature of sin—invoked by the internal sinful nature—is involuntary by his idea of the freewill before the fall. Man must not loose sight of free will, because when he does, he will find himself endorsing an antinomianistic and hedonistic mindset. The free will is the grounds for all moral responsibility, and Calvin cannot claim man to have free will after the fall if he endorses a prelapsarian intellectualist and postlapsarian voluntarist stance. According to Calvin, no man can act as a human after the fall, and no sin is a human act.
I have a sinking feeling that I am wrong. I think I am implying that their operation/relationship is essential to them. Yet I am saying that their cooperation is essential to human acts. How can a human be held responsible for non-human acts? Yet are human acts operations? If so then most of my paper is kaput. OR at least seems to be...Is man his actions?--or rather are man's actions part of what defines him as he Is?....hm, can he said to be man if he cannot behave as a man? Must you be able to act as a man to be a man? If all I can do is act as an animal it would seem that by restricting the rational element I am no longer a man. But what of mentally deficient conditions? He is still a man. Yet accountability seems to be removed, for as the mentally handicapped are not held accountable, so no man could be. So the question then would not be, "Is he still a man if he does not act as man?" but rather, "can a man be held responsible for his non-human acts?" I must think this through. Hm...
"No temptation has overtaken you that is not common to man. God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your ability, but with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape, that you may be able to endure it" (1Corinthians 10:13). It would seem that there must be the capability for all men to either choose sin, or to choose God and His aid. If God says that a man can, then he can. "Keep the economy free from fantasy"(Maximus the Confessor)
Some additional sentences (note that these thoughts are not thought to be in order by their author):
For one of the most comprehensive adaptations of the modified intellectualist theory of Aristotle to Christianity, one must turn to Aquinas. Aquinas defines the will as “rational appetite” (88), and in doing so makes any human acts inseparable from the intellect. The appetite, or will, has two main functions or components, the inclination and ability to choose (Hoitenga, 25). The inclination is the power that moves man to seek an object that is not presently possessed or some end that is not yet attained by an appropriate means. The ability to choose enables man to select the means to attain the end, and even to select between two or more competing ends. In regards to activity, Hoitenga states, “it is in virtue of these two components of the will that we are moved, that we move ourselves, to perform any properly human action” (25). However, the appetite when considered in itself is irrational.
Intellect, according to Calvin and Aquinas, does not possess in itself the power of activity or the ability to exert choice, but it does contain in itself a role of leadership in the form of two kinds of judgment. The intellect judges the moral or beneficial nature of an end, and the second form of the judgment is the capability to discern what means are best suited to that end. The intellect brings rationality to the appetites/will of man, by making “the will completely amenable to the guidance of reason” (Calvin, 195)
An intellectualist view of the free will, as Calvin puts forth, is the uncoerced ability to choose and attain either good or evil, but not free to act apart from what the knowledge deems as good. The will always wills the good, man, however, is not coerced by the intellect, but is attracted to the good that the intellect presents to man. Thus, man moves himself towards an end in agreement with his will and to his delight.
Calvin introduces the relationship between understanding and will in a strictly intellectualistic way, but proceeds to imply the will as the cause for man’s fall, which implies a voluntarist view. He defines the will as choice directed by man’s understanding, and in turn, understanding is explained as the cognitive faculty that discerns an end as either good or bad. The will is also explained by Calvin to have a natural inclination towards the good. Calvin further states that “the will is always mindful of the bidding of the understanding, and in its own desires awaits the judgment of the understanding” (Calvin, 1.15.7).
As Geisler states, “Rationality in man cannot be destroyed all together; otherwise he could no longer sin” (Geisler 158). The ability of man to direct himself hinges on the intellect. It cannot be suggested that man chooses out of necessity because it destroys all merit and demerit of human actions, and thus is heretical (Geisler, 158). Calvin’s definition of the free will after the fall, according to intellectualism, is coercion, because the human acts are lead by the intellect, and the principle of coercion is the same both before and after the fall. According to Aquinas necessity is an external agent exerting hostile motion, or coercion upon another, so that he cannot do the contrary (Geisler, 158). Coercion and volition cannot simultaneously exist because volition is the will’s own motion towards its natural inclination. The nature of a man is essential, his choice is not, and thus of necessity man wills happiness because it is integrated with his nature.
By total depravity Calvin does not mean that a man is incapable of performing good deeds to others, or “Horizontal” good, but he does mean that man is void of all spiritual goods, or “vertical” goods (Geisler 57). Calvin ‘common grace,’”. Common grace is God’s universal restraint of man’s will—a restraint necessary because without it man would destroy himself (Calvin 292-293). The virtue of pagans, explained by Calvin as God’s moderation of man, is not a cleansing of man’s soul and thus cannot be supposed to be a possible foothold for man coming to salvation by his own will. What is meant by horizontal good is that man may perform good deeds amongst men, while a vertical good would require a heart that desires the good, so that his deeds may be lifted to God as pleasing.
This view of the freedom of the will after the fall Calvin shares with Augustine. Augustine believes that the will is “unfree,” yet he is “angry towards those who deny that the will is free” (Calvin 265). Augustine explains himself by stating, “Only let no one so dare to deny the decision of the will as to wish to excuse sin” (Calvin 256). He believes that the will is not free “without the Spirit […] since it has been laid under by shackling and conquering desires,” but that it is most certainly the decision of man (Calvin 265). Both agree that man’s act of sin is volitional despite the necessity of sin, because the cause of sin is his will, and thus internal and not external. This relationship is possible because Calvin believes man’s necessity to sin to be intrinsic with man’s fallen nature.
According to Aquinas it is impossible to ascribe to man as a whole a uniformity of choice, though man can be said to universally contain the same faculties. The will and intellect are not to be understood in regards to the soul as organs are to a body. The use of these faculties belongs exclusively to the person. These powers of the soul are not exerted by the soul naturally, and thus all choices and wills are particular since each person is distinct. Uniform operation of these faculties is not within man’s scope of distinction since it would bring about the removal of the free-will through the abolishment of the person, and free will is necessary for sin to be attributed to a particular man. The person must move man, and person is not a nature.
As a critique, Calvin’s view of the fallen will does not account for the virtuous acts of the unregenerate, and why someone without a renewed heart would desire to do good. If a man is inclined to do wickedness at all times, then any opportunity when he has a choice between good and evil, he would choose and do the evil, being incapable of the good.
The discussion of the will and intellect finds its deepest roots in the Greek concept of man, which affirms right reason—intellect as the “the defining power of the human soul” (Hoitenga, 23). Reason, according to the Greeks, is not only the governing authority of the soul, but the power over all that pertains to human life, by taking reign over the irrational elements of man, namely his desires and passions. Calvin criticizes the philosophers for placing too much emphasis on the mind and its reasoning capacity in a man’s life on earth. He states that they fail to take into consideration the fallen condition of man, but they would be right had man’s perfection been retained. In contrast, Scripture offers the heart as the origin of man’s actions and thoughts. However, despite the fact that the heart is not clearly distinguished from the soul or mind, it generally includes man’s “deepest desires, inclinations, and affections” (Hoitenga 24).
Man is a rational animal, and thus his actions, in order to be considered human acts, must be rational. In order for his actions to be considered free, man must self-determine what he does by possessing in himself the final cause for his actions, and the final cause is circumscribed in accordance with what the relationship between the intellect and appetite is. This reality of free will is difficult because of the necessary minutiae one must consider regarding the intellect and appetite, but it is relevant because of its direct moral implications. Free will is the foundation for moral responsibility and a moral life, yet as to what the free will is, philosophers and theologians have disagreed for centuries, due to their conflicting views concerning the nature of the will. However, moral philosophers and theologians agree, “If there is no freedom in us but we are moved of necessity to will, then deliberate choice, encouragement, precept, punishment, praise, and blame are removed” (Geisler 158) Due to the pervading influence of Calvin’s Institutes in this great discussion concerning human responsibility, understanding Calvin’s concept of the will is vital to addressing the present day feud between Calvinists and Armenians as Christians seek to understand what predestination is, and how God intended this soteriological comfort to be seen. It is therefore important to expose any loose ends or inconsistencies in the theory that John Calvin puts forth in his Institutes concerning the will. Although Calvin believes in the will’s dominance over man’s actions after the fall necessitates volitional sin, Calvin, by being both a prelapsarian (before the fall) intellectualist and postlapsarian (after the fall) voluntarist, is inconsistent and does not allow for free human acts after the fall, because he destroys the intellects ability to direct the will in his fallen state.
Geisler points out that the theory of a nature directed will is problematic because it presents five logical fallacies (27-28). First of all, the doctrine contains in itself two contradictory beliefs: “A good being cannot will evil,” and “Lucifer, a good being, willed evil” (28). Secondly, this theory would imply that no man can justly be blamed for any acts of sin, since he would have no say in the matter. Thirdly, the theory of will directed by nature blurs the concepts of desire and decision with one another, and that though one may desire a good it does not mean that he does it. Fourthly, this theory is a form of determinism, which is to say that all acts of man would be caused by an external force, because something external made his nature and determined its faculties and desires, thus man would not move himself. Fifthly, and finally, after a Christian has been renewed by the Spirit and receives a nature that is slave to righteousness, he would not sin if his nature dictates his will.
Aquinas’s definition of the will finds its foundation in Aristotle. The will and intellect are powers of the human being that are not distinguishable from the person who has them. It is the person who thinks and wills. It is not a faculty that is exercised in uniformity with all, but particular to every person. These faculties are powers of the soul and performed by a person. The person makes use of these functions. The soul is personalized and thus since they are not centers of activity in us they are, they are exercised by the person not the soul. It is an internal act of the soul, not an external bodily act but the latter proceeds from the former. The will and intellect are exertions of power that are performed by the person and contained in the soul. Perhaps insert the law of identity. The will and intellect are not faculties of the soul like organs are to the body which are self-functioning. The stomach digests naturally without conscious thought, but the will does not merely will—it is directed by a particular identity. The intellectual judgments enable man to attain a wide rage of ends in a wide variety of way, to postpone the attainment of ends in contrast with the instant satisfaction that is character of the appetite apart from the rationalizing intellect, and allows man to account for his actions by answering why he did what he did. “Human beings, in contrast to other animals, can know what they are doing (or what they are about to do), why they do it, and whether it is good or evil.”
By defining the will in such a fashion Aquinas circumscribes what the freedom of the will is. The will naturally follows the lead of the intellect in its pursuit of what is good, and what is good is that which the mind perceives as helpful, where that which is evil is what is seen as harmful. The will is not free in the sense that it can lead man to any end that is not the good. Man does not desire what harms. The will does not pursue inferior means, but the purposed superior, but a man does possess a desire for both the true evil and good, that his will may move to either. The will is subject to the intellect.
Calvin finds the pinnacle of his influence in Augustine, which is not hard to believe, since he quotes him more than any other author in his Institutes. The two most notable contributions that Augustine lends to Calvin are his expositions on the trinity and doctrine of original sin. In regards to the latter, it was Augustine’s writings that served to establish the doctrine, and he defended it against attacks from contemporary theologians. He is also known as one of the most famous anti-Pelagian authors.
Pelagius was a fourth and fifth century British monk who taught against the doctrine of original sin, which is the transmission of the innate depravity resulting from Adam’s first sin from one generation to the next. Pelagius believed that men are born sinless, but become sinful. In addition to denying an innate sinful nature, Pelagius stresses the point of man’s free will, which by his definition is to say that man can avoid sinning and freely choose God’s commands.
In denying the doctrine of original sin, Pelagius was deemed a heretic by the church, and incurred upon himself a barrage of anti-Pelagian treatises and letters defending the doctrine of original sin. These anti-Pelagian writers gain Calvin’s admiration, which he expresses when he states, “Therefore, good men (and Augustine above the rest) labored to show us that we are corrupted not by derived wickedness, but that we bear inborn defect from our mother’s womb” (247).
Calvin’s Institutes is one of the most influential books of Christianity up to date. Few churches have evaded his influence, and no matter where a Christian goes he is bound to encounter Calvin induced theology. Most notable of all contributions, to the chagrin of some, are his writing on predestination. Some have hailed Calvin’s teachings as the most profound and sound exposition of biblical concepts, while others condemn them as blasphemous. Certain groups believe it sobers man to his fallen state while others believe it neglects God’s omnibenevolence. Surprisingly enough in many discussions concerning Calvinism, Calvin is not consulted—an unfortunate habit that may have sloth to blame. So what did Calvin teach? Are his followers correct in their interpretation of his writings? Have teachings been attributed to Calvin that are not his own? Such questions are worthy of our attention. Ultimately, this doctrine has significant affects on a man’s view of God, and since man has a calling to know God all are obligated to at least pursue an understanding of the soteriological comfort that is Election.
A man’s reaction reveals his heart. Within Scripture there is an epic polar struggle between a man and his sin. Within Calvin’s Institutes man is characterized as hopelessly enslaved to, and infatuated with, his sinful nature, and thus any conversion must be in some sense the coercion of man by God. Man is a rational animal, and his soul’s essential faculties retain their same essential ability to respond and direct man towards or away from God after the fall. For his actions to be considered free, he must self-determine what he does. This means that man must possess in himself the final cause for his actions. The reality of man’s free will has direct moral implications, because it is the foundation for all moral responsibility and ability to perform moral acts. Moral philosophers and theologians universally agree, “If there is no freedom in us but we are moved of necessity to will, then deliberate choice, punishment, praise, and blame are removed” (Geisler 158). Due to the pervading influence of Calvin’s Institutes in the great discussion concerning human responsibility and man’s state after the fall, it is important to understand the theory that John Calvin puts forth concerning the relationship between the will, intellect, and sinful nature. It is also vital to weigh his comments with those found in Romans chapter seven where Paul recounts his struggle with his sinful nature. Although Calvin necessitates volitional sin, and the unconditional adherence of man’s will and intellect to depravity after the fall, I think Calvin inappropriately disregards the ability of man’s intellect and will to discern ends or means contrary to his sinful nature, because he does not account for Paul’s desire for good in his unregenerate state.
Man’s acts of servitude to sin are volitional, because consent is the acceptance of any action as one’s own. Furthermore, since a man endorses the actions, all acts must gain the support of both the will and reason. However, it is here that Calvin wrongly restricts the human condition with the inability to become displeased with evil through the exercise of reason and appetite. Though it is appropriate to state that man is born in a state that consents to sin, due to sin’s pleasing appearance to the soul, he goes too far when he declares that man, in his fallen state, is unable to respond to God positively and choose Him for himself in opposition to the sinful nature’s direction.
At the heart of explaining the will and intellect’s ability to guide man, or operate apart from the sinful nature after the fall, stands Paul’s epistle to the Romans. In it, Paul states that, “I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing” (Romans 7:19). Paul has a desire for the good apart from his flesh, or sinful nature, but he is unable to bring about that desired end because he is a slave to sin. Slavery to sin is the state in which the sinful nature assumes control over the activity of a man and puts him at the complete disposal of his sinful nature. This is what Paul is referring to when he states, “I am of the flesh, sold under sin” (Romans 7:14). Paul, with his mind and desire, designs upon the good, but his decision is rendered fruitless.
The context of Paul’s dilemma within Romans chapter seven is that of an unregenerate state. Thus any assumption that man’s reason cannot move man towards the good before conversion is thwarted. This is seen when Paul states that the “law of his mind” has decided upon the good. This interpretation is seen in two key ways: in Paul’s explanation of his state, and purpose for writing the illustration.
Among the expressions Paul uses to explain his state in his struggle, there are a number of phrases that contradict other explanations of the Christian’s life if it is to refer to him in a regenerate state. Paul begins his illustration of the struggle between the soul’s faculties and the sinful nature with the ardent claim, “For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am of the flesh, sold under sin” (Romans 7:14). One cannot use slavery to sin to explain the life of a Christian through the Spirit, as proven by Paul when he states, “But now that you have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God,” and “You, however, are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if in fact the Spirit of God dwells in you,” in explaining the life of a Christian (Romans 6:22; 8:9). As a Christian, man is no longer a slave to sin, but a slave to righteousness.
Other phrases that cannot be applied to the life of a Christian are his self-condemning exclamations of his present state. Paul declares, “I know that nothing good dwells in me,” and claims himself to be “wretched;” however, it is characteristic of a Christian’s life that “there is no condemnation, for those who are in Christ Jesus” (Romans 7:18, 24; 8:1). This freedom from condemnation refers to any reproach which would come from God or man. In this way, if Paul were to speak of himself in such lowly terms he would be both slandering and condemning.
The second key point that reveals Paul’s intent behind his portrayal of the internal struggle between the flesh, and his desire for good and law of the mind, is in his audience and main focus throughout Romans seven as a whole. Paul begins by declaring that he is speaking “to those who know the law,” and not necessarily to an audience of Christians (Romans 7:1). By not being directly intended for the specific application by Christians, Paul shows that he is reaching a relevant issue within a crowd of unsaved individuals.
Paul’s purpose in writing this deeply personal struggle is to expose the Mosaic Law’s limited ability to save or protect man from sin. In the passage “I was once alive apart from the law, but when the commandment came, sin came alive and I died,” Paul informs his readers that he had believed himself to have kept the law in its entirety, but that ultimately it was unable to save him, and became his death (Romans 7:9). Paul in this story interweaves the whole process of a man reasoning, groaning, striving, and escaping from the legal state to the free state in Christ.
According to Calvin, man’s freedom “to choose the good,” was lost in the fall entirely (Calvin 196), but Paul clearly demonstrates the intellect’s retained ability to move man, by rationalizing and directing desire towards the good. Man is not able to do what he desires apart from the flesh, but he can desire and rationalize a different choice apart from the direction of the sinful nature.
Romans chapter seven, verse sixteen expresses Paul’s coming to terms with sin’s detestability. He states, “Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is good” (Romans 7:16). He has been “stung,” as it were, by the “consciousness of his own unhappiness,” and thus gains a bit of insight into the being of God, namely His law, which, in turn, Paul professes to be good in light of his dissatisfaction with evil (Calvin 36). This reaction of Paul’s serves as a context for him to turn to God and seek deliverance from his body of death. Paul’s mind discerns God’s law as good, but he is incapable of preserving righteousness or changing himself, because he is “dead,” and cannot save himself.
Although Calvin necessitates volitional sin, and the unconditional adherence of the will and intellect to depravity in man after the fall, I think Calvin inappropriately disregards the ability of man’s intellect and will to discern ends or means contrary to his sinful nature, because he destroys the ability of the will to desire good after the fall. Paul demonstrates clearly in his illustration of the unbeliever’s struggle with his own inability to do what is good, that a man may rationalize a desire for the good in opposition to his sinful nature. This is achieved when the flesh’s contradiction with what a man discerns with his mind to be good or helpful is exposed. When man is struck by the negative nature of the flesh, as Paul expresses, it is possible for him to desire the good. Calvin’s view of the fallen soul and the complete dominance of the sinful nature over understanding and will does not allow for the struggle of Romans seven.
Annotated Bibliography
Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press. 1960.
John Calvin, a second generation Reformer, writes an extensive representation of Reformed theology. Though it is not meant to be read as a systematic work, it contains in itself a vast array of Christian doctrine adorned with arrestingly elegant rhetoric. The Institutes is one of the most influential texts in Christianity, and was written as an introduction to the Bible, and is a profound teaching tool.
Hoitenga Jr., Dewy J. John Calvin and the will: A Critique and Corrective. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Books, a Division of Baker Book House Company. 1997.
Dr. Hoitenga writes a corrective and critique on John Calvin’s exposition of the will in his Institutes with the intent of motivating Reformed theologians and philosophers to develop a consistent and sound Reformed theory of the human will. He explores Calvin’s use of both voluntarism and intellectualism when describing both the created and corrupted natures of man. Hoitenga’s intent is to improve upon Reformed theology by directing future theologians through Calvin’s inconsistency, and applying a remedy.
Geisler, Norman. Chosen but Free: A Balanced View of Divine Election. Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany House Publishers. 2001.
Geisler, a moderate Calvinist and president of Southern Evangelical Seminary, writes a comprehensive, concise, and balanced view of the interpretation of presentation as it is expressed in Scripture. He takes into consideration the varying view present within the theological community and addresses both extreme Calvinists and Armenians.
Aquinas, Thomas. Treatise on Happiness. Translator, John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1983.
In his exposition on happiness, Aquinas explores the elements that contribute or detract from human happiness as God created it, with a philosophical style and theological center. Aquinas addresses such topics as man’s ultimate end, the will, and choice, ultimately to illuminate happiness. After coming to the conclusion of man’s happiness being necessarily contingent on God Aquinas analyzes acts and the nature thereof.
